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Case No. 8787 
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of the 
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W. P. ROGERS and MAGNA MIN-
ING COMPANY, a New Mexico 
Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents) 
-vs.-
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Defendant and Appellant. 
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IN THE, S·UP'REME CO·URT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. P. ROGERS and MAGNA MIN-
ING COMPANY, a New Mexico 
Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
UNITED WESTERN MINERALS 
COMPANY, a Deleware Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8787 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
AND APPELLANT 
APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 
·The Statement of Facts set forth in the original 
Brief filed herein by Defendant and Appellant, herein-
after referred to as Appellant, has been accepted by 
Plaintiffs and Respondents in their Brief as being "sub-
stantially accurate to the extent it has gone." Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, hereinafter referred to as Respondents, 
added to the Statement of Facts only one item, that being 
a certain letter (R. 29) referred to by Plaintiffs andRe-
spondents in their Brief and set forth in the Appendix 
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2 
thereto as Exhibit I. We are indebted to Respondents for 
including this particular letter in their Brief. If any 
doubt existed at any time or in the minds of any persons 
as to the meaning of the parties in connection with the 
August 4, 1955 Agreement (Exhibit "A" in the Appendix 
to Appellant's original Brief), that doubt was utterly 
and completely removed by the parties themselves when 
they drafted, agreed to, executed and approved the said 
letter from which we quote the following excerpts: 
" ... The terms of the Agreement, dated Au-
gust 4, 1955, call for the following consideration 
payable by United Western Minerals Company, 
in addition to the amount of $125,000 to be paid 
out of 15% of the gross mineral production from 
the Coleman Canyon Group of claims." 
"The consideration of the Coleman Canyon 
Group, in addititon to the above mentioned pay-
ment out of mineral production, is $15,000 in cash 
and $15,000 in cash or common stock of our com-
pany, valued at $1.00 per share." 
" ... The date for the beginning of payments 
out of gross mineral production, provided for in 
clause 3 of the Agreement of August -!, 1955, will 
be postponed until April4, 1956." 
"Kindly signify your approval of the fore-
going terms for payment of the consideration pay-
able under the Agreement of August 4, 1955, by 
signing the endorsement at the foot of this letter." 
This letter on the stationery of the Defendant was 
signed by its President, Alva A. Sin1pson~ Jr., and was 
approved in writing by both Plaintiffs, W. P. Rogers 
and Magna ~{ining Company. It sho\YS clearly that the 
$125,000 amount was to be paid out of 15% of the gross 
mineral production, and that any obligation to pay that 
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amount was dependent on mineral production which in 
turn was dependent on the presence of ore in commercial 
quantities. No mention of any kind was made of a month-
ly minimum payment requirement regardless of mineral 
production or which would indicate by any stretch of the 
imagination that a minimum payment was required even 
though ores and minerals could not be produced from the 
claims in commercial quantities. 
By this letter the parties themselves not only inter-
preted their contract but they placed their interpretation 
in writing. We agree with Respondents as set forth on 
page 2 of their Brief that the interpretation of a contract 
given by the parties themselves is the best evidence of 
their intent. 12 Am. J ur. 787 discusses the interpretation 
of contracts by the parties thereto and uses this language: 
"In the determination of the meaning of an 
indefinite or ambiguous contract, the interpreta-
tion placed upon the contract by the parties them-
selves is to be considered by the court and is 
entitled to great, if not controlling, influence in 
ascertaining their understanding of its terms. 
In fact the courts will generally follow such prac-
tical interpretation of a doubtful contract. It is to 
be assumed that parties to a contract know best 
what was meant by its terms and are the least 
likely to be mistaken as to its intention; that each 
party is alert to protect his own interests and to 
insist on his rights; and that whatever is done by 
the parties during the period of the performance 
of the contract is done under its terms as they 
understood and intended it should be. Parties are 
far less likely to have been mistaken as to the 
meaning of their contract during the period when 
they are in harmony and practical interpretation 
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reflects that meaning than when subsequent dif-
ferences have impelled them to resort to law and 
one of them then seeks an interpretation at vari-
ance with their practical interpretation of its pro-
visions. Where the language of a contract is 
uncertain and the parties thereto, by their subse-
quent acts and conduct, have shown that they 
construed it alike and within the purview of the 
constructions permitted as possible by such lan-
guage, the courts will ordinarily follow such 
adopted construction as the correct one. It has 
even been said that the practical interpretation of 
the ambiguous terms of a contract will be adopted, 
although the language used may more strongly 
suggest another interpretation." 
We feel that the agreement itself is unambiguous and 
clear and that when it is read in its entirety and is an-
alyzed pursuant to established rules of logic and reason 
and from a grammatical standpoint, and when considera-
tion is duly given to the language used by the parties 
themselves, there can be no doubt that the obligation to 
pay the $125,000 amount depended entirely on the exist-
ence of a situation under which "ore or minerals can be 
produced therefrom in commercial quantities." 
However, if any ambiguity existed in the contract, 
the same was resolved by the parties "~hen they approved 
the wording and language of the N oven1ber 2, 1955, letter 
referred to above. 
To give to the contract the interpretation contended 
for by Respondents in their Brief requires not an inter-
pretation of the contract but a revision thereof. Such con-
struction requires that no effect or consideration be given 
to the following clause contained in sub-paragraph (c) 
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of paragraph 2 of the Agreement: "shall be paid for out 
of 15% of the gross mineral production from said group 
of claims," and to eliminate from the contract or give no 
effect to the following words and provisions from para-
graph 3 thereof: " ... so long as ore or minerals can be 
produced therefrom in commercial quantities ... " and 
" ... in lieu of production." In other words, instead of 
having said paragraph read as it now does, it is neces-
sary that the contract be modified to exclude part of the 
provisions or to give no consideration to them so that in 
the guise of contruing the contract the same is actually 
re-written to read as follows: 
"As to the payment of the purchase price ... 
there shall be no actual payment due to Sellers 
by Buyer for six months after the date of this 
Agreement; howeve~, the obligation shall accrue 
... even though the payment is delayed until six 
months after the date of this Agreement. There-
after, payment shall be made monthly . . . ;pro-
vided, however, that Buyer ... shall pay Sellers 
the sum of $500 each and every month ... The 
sum of $500.00 per month so paid shall be credited 
upon the unpaid balance of the purchase price." 
Where we have indicated a succession of periods in 
the above paragraph, it is to show that certain words and 
provisions used by the parties and which must be given 
due meaning and consideration have been eliminated, 
since the construction placed on the contract by the Plain-
tiffs and Respondents and by the lower Court requires 
such elimination. 
Again in paragraph 10 of the Agreement it is pro-
vided that payments are to be made out of production 
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or in the sum of $500.00 per month if Defendant fails to 
operate and mine the claims "as hereinabove provided," 
which ties the duty of payment to production and to the 
availability of ore and minerals in commercial quan-
tities. 
When we come to the letter of November 2, 1955, 
above referred to, again it is clear that the construction 
contended for by Plaintiffs and Respondents requires not 
an interpretation of the letter but a revision thereof and 
an elimination therefrom of very pertinent parts and 
provisions. Furthermore, the construction of the next 
to the last paragraph of the November 2, 1955, letter is 
determined by the same considerations as the construc-
tion of clause 3 of the original Agreement. 
In reply to some of the statements made by Plain-
tiffs and Respondents in their Brief, we agree that while 
the parties were not conscious at the time of executing 
the Agreement of "highly academic requirements of logic 
and grammar," they still meant what they said and they 
still intended that the statements they made and the pro-
visions they incorporated were to be given a reasonable 
and logical construction and that the various 'Yords, ex-
planations and statements made by them "~ere to be con-
sidered and not ignored. 
Furthermore, contrary to the statements made in 
Respondent's Brief, Appellants did not have an unquali-
fied obligation to produce but had an obligation to pro-
duce only so long as ore or 1ninerals could be produced 
in commercial quantities or if they failed to do so, then 
to pay a Ininilnu1n n1onthly pay1nent. The parties so 
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stated and they had a reason for so stating. Again, con-
trary to the statement made in Respondents' Brief, the 
language is not that Appellant shall "pay $500.00 per 
month in lieu of mining and producing said claims," but 
the language as actually quoted from the contract itself 
and not from Respondents' distorted interpretation 
thereof is that "buyer shall have the obligation of either 
continuously mining and operating said claims so long 
as ore or minerals can be produced therefrom in com-
mercial quantities, or if it fails to do so, shall pay Sellers 
the sum of $500.00 each and every month in lieu of pro-
duction." 
We agree that the parties contemplated a situation 
where ore might be present or might not be present and 
so they provided for a sale price of $155,000.00, $30,000.00 
of which was to be paid in any event and the balance of 
which, namely, $125,000 was to be paid "out of 15% of the 
gross mineral production from said group of claims." 
The Buyer assumed all the risks with respect to part of 
the total amount, that is, $30,000.00, but as to the balance 
the parties stated that it was to be paid only out of gross 
mineral production, which would depend on the avail-
ability of ores and minerals on the claims. If such ores 
and minerals existed, then the Buyer was given an option 
to continuously mine and operate the claims so long as 
ores or minerals could be produced in commercial quan-
tities or to pay a minimurn of $500.00 per month in lieu 
thereof. Since the payment of this $125,000.00 was to be 
out of production there was not an unqualified obligation 
to produce since this cannot be reconciled with the reali-
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ties of the situation, for it is obviously impossible to pro-
duce ore if there is no ore present. 
Therefore, the parties themselves agreed that if ores 
existed and could be produced in commercial quantities, 
the $125,000 amount was payable out of production except 
that, if for any reason Buyer did not want to continuously 
mine and operate or for any reason failed to do so (ore 
being available), then it was required to pay $500.00 
monthly in lieu of production. What could be more 
realistic and practical~ 
If the parties had intended an absolute obligation on 
the part of Appellant to pay the $125,000.00 amount, they 
would have provided to that effect and would have set 
forth required periodic instalment payments without any 
reference to production or availability of commercial 
ores. Instead, the whole obligation was to pay out of 
production or to pay minimum monthly payments if 
Buyer failed to produce so long as ores and minerals 
could be produced in commercial quantities. 
·Appellant has not taken the position ~'that should it 
not see fit to make the property productive, the unpaid 
purchase price would be forgiven," as stated in Respon-
dents' Brief, P. 9. Instead, it has contended that the 
obligation to pay the $125,000 amount depended upon 
the existence on the claims of ore and minerals which 
conld be produced in commercial quantities. The Lower 
Court failed to require Respondents to prove that such 
situation existed and also refused to permit Appellant 
to show that the exploratory progran1 undertaken by it 
disproved the existence of a connnercial ore body. 
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Appellant has paid $30,000.00 consideration for the 
Coleman Canyon claims, which payment was not made 
contingent on production. It has paid a great sum of 
money in exploratory work, development, roads, etc. The 
Respondents are now endeavoring to make it pay for 
something which is absolutely worthless and on which 
no ore body exists in commercial quantities and which 
would enable Appellant to make the payments which the 
parties themselves made dependent on the existence of 
ores or minerals producible from the claims in commer-
cial quantities. 
APPELLANT'S POINT 5 
Appellant respectfully submits that Respondents' 
Brief does not answer the arguments stated in Appel-
lant's Brief on Point 5. Respondents Amended Complaint 
was not further amended at either the trial or pre-trial. 
There is no question of inconsistent remedies being asked. 
Instead the pleadings asked one remedy and were not 
amended. The election was thereby made. By its Pre-
Trial Order and Judgment the Lower Court gave Re-
spodents a remedy not mentioned in their pleadings, but 
which was also inconsistent with the remedy they elected 
in their pleadings to pursue. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS 
& MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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